The economic context of solidarity. Period vs. Cohort Differences in Support for Income Redistribution in Britain and the United States by Meuleman, Bart
 1 
The economic context of solidarity. Period vs. Cohort Differences in 
Support for Income Redistribution in Britain and the United States 
 
Bart Meuleman, University of Leuven (Belgium) 
 
***Accepted for publication in European Societies*** 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how support for income redistribution has evolved over the last 
decades in Great Britain and the United States, and whether economic indicators are 
related to these changes. I analyse repeated cross-sectional data from the British Social 
Attitudes survey (1986-2014) and the General Social Survey (1978-2014) by means of 
hierarchical age-period-cohort models, which makes it possible to disentangle cohort 
and year effects of economic context. This approach suggests that the level of inequality 
indeed matters for individuals’ redistributive preferences. The observed patterns are 
more complex and intricate, however, than what is postulated by median voter theory. 
Most importantly, a cohort’s redistribute preferences seem to be related to the level of 
inequality experienced during its formative years (measured by the top 1% income 
share). American cohorts born during the post-war period of low inequality are found to 
be most averse of income redistribution by the government. In Britain cohort 
differences are markedly less outspoken and, surprisingly, the opposite pattern is found. 
Such cohort dynamics have been largely neglected in research on redistributive 
preferences. Besides cohort effects of economic inequality, the British data also reveal 
an impact of the level of inequality prevailing in the year of survey. In line with an 
institutionalist perspective, British citizens living in more unequal times are not more, 
but less supportive of redistribution.  
 
Key words: income inequality, redistribution, public opinion, median voter hypothesis, 
age-period-cohort analysis, British Social Attitudes survey, General Social Survey
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The economic context of solidarity. Period vs. Cohort Differences in 
Support for Income Redistribution in Britain and the United States 
 
1. Introduction 
The 2008 financial crisis has spurred lively debates on income inequality and its societal 
consequences. One of the issues at stake relates to the question how economic turbulent 
times affect societies’ capacity for solidarity. This paper engages with the debate on the 
relation between economic crises and solidarity by investigating to what extent 
economic contexts shape citizens’ views on income redistribution by the government, 
i.e. arguably the most consequential form of institutionalized solidarity in contemporary 
Western societies (Alesina & Angeletos 2005; Bradley et al. 2003; Kenworthy & 
Pontussen 2005). As such, I understand solidarity as a set of shared normative 
preferences regarding the legitimacy of the redistribution of wealth by means of 
government intervention (i.e., what is called civic solidarity in the introduction to this 
special issue). By focusing on the impact of economic conditions, this paper contributes 
to knowledge on the contextual origins of solidarity.  
 
Various studies have pointed out that economic indicators, such as actual levels of 
inequality or general economic performance, shape citizens’ redistributional 
preferences (Blekesaune 2007; Bowles & Gintis 2000; Dallinger 2010; Finseraas 2009; 
Jæger 2013; Lübker 2007; Schmidt-Catran 2016). A potentially important limitation of 
this body of research is that the impact of economic context is uniquely conceptualized 
as an instantaneous and homogeneous effect. Episodes of economic hardship or high 
inequality are presupposed to exercise an instant impact that is uniform across all birth 
cohorts, and this effect is assumed to wither as soon as economic indicators shift back to 
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their original level. From a life-course perspective (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Becker & 
Hermkens 1993) social change is not solely driven by immediate period effects, but 
should be understood primordially as replacement of cohorts who experienced different 
realities during adolescence. This paper does justice to this theoretical argument by 
studying the demand for redistribution over a longer period that includes different 
economic conjunctures. This approach renders it possible to disentangle cohort and 
year differences, and to test whether the prevailing economic conditions or those during 
the formative years are most relevant to understand opinion change.  
 
My empirical analyses focus on Great Britain1 and the United States. Concretely, I 
address the following research questions: (1) How has support for redistribution 
evolved in Britain and the US over the last decades? (2) Which role do period effects or 
cohort differences play in these evolutions? (3) And to what extent can economic 
indicators –notably the actual level of income inequality- account for the observed 
period and cohort differences? To answer these questions, I analyse repeated cross-
sectional data from the General Social Survey (GSS) in the US (1978–2014) and the 
British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) in the Britain (1986–2014) by means of 
Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort (HAPC) models (Yang & Land 2006). 
 
2. Theory and previous research 
There exists a long-standing research tradition attempting to understand differences in 
redistributive efforts between countries, as well as the role of citizens’ conceptions of 
social justice herein (Alesina & Angeletos 2005; Blekesaune 2007; Bradley et al. 2003; 
                                                        
1 Inhabitants of Great Britain are the population of the survey data analysed, while the economic 
indicators and social policies refer to the United Kingdom (i.e. Great Britain and Northern Ireland). 
Therefore, both territorial indications are used throughout this paper, depending on the context. 
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Kenworthy & McCall 2008; Kluegel & Smith 1986). A key idea in this field is that the 
economic conditions, such as the actual degree of income inequality, shape the 
redistributive preferences of populations. However, a variety of theoretical mechanisms 
underlying the link between economic context and demand for redistribution have been 
proposed, and opposing expectations can be formulated. 
 
2.1 Median voter theory 
The median voter hypothesis (Meltzer & Richard 1981) has obtained the widest 
currency in the field of political economy, and postulates that the demand for 
redistribution will be most outspoken in contexts with high levels of inequality. This 
rational choice approach assumes that individuals attempt to maximize their marginal 
utility, and predicts that persons whose earnings fall below the average income will 
favour redistribution by the government. Given that income distributions are right-
skewed in advanced capitalist societies, the median voter –who is assumed to be 
decisive in the political process (Roberts 1977)- will advocate redistributive policies. 
According to this line of argument, the support base for redistribution is a direct result 
of the distance between the median and the mean income. In other words, the degree of 
income inequality is positively related to the demand for redistribution (Finseraas 2009; 
Schmidt-Catran 2016). 
 
Several additional arguments have been formulated to broaden this rather narrow self-
interest approach. First, this rational choice-based argument assumes that citizens are 
well informed about the level of income inequality, which is questionable assumption 
(Kenworthy & McCall 2008: 35). Individuals may hold widely varying perceptions about 
the level of inequality, which in turn shape redistribute preferences (Gijsberts 2002). In 
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political debates on inequalities tend to focus either on the bottom or on the top end of 
the income distribution (Ragusa 2015) rather than on evolutions in the middle. Because 
the income share of the top incomes is more visible and volatile (Scheve & Stasavage 
2009), it could have a stronger influence on public opinion than summary measures of 
inequality, such as the GINI index.    
 
Second, Iversen (2005) stresses that income redistribution is not a purely monetary 
transaction in the present time. Redistribution also entails an aspect of insurance 
against future adverse events, which is discounted in individuals’ preferences for 
redistribution. Therefore not only income, but also other socio-economic characteristics 
are relevant predictors of distributive preferences. Various personal risk variables -such 
as educational attainment, social class positions, sector of employment, work skill 
specificity or expectations of future social mobility- are expected to affect support for 
redistribution (Jæger 2013; Svallfors 1993, 1997; Cusack, Iversen & Rehm  2006; Alesina 
& La Ferrara 2005; Kelley & Evans 1993). Following a similar argument at the 
contextual level, one can expect that not only a skewed income distribution, but also 
various aspects of macroeconomic hardship increase popular demand for government 
intervention (i.e. the so-called government protection hypothesis; Blekesaune 2007). 
Concretely, one could expect that staggering economic growth induces economic 
insecurities that stimulate citizens’ demand for government protection. Given that wage 
labour is a primary source of income for many citizens, labour market indicators, such 
as the unemployment rate, might be of particular relevance to understand public 
attitudes towards welfare and redistribution (van Oorschot & Meuleman 2014).  
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Summarizing, this line of thinking predicts that the prevailing level of economic inequality 
(Hypothesis 1a) and particularly the concentration of income at the top of the distribution 
(Hypothesis 1b) are positively related to support for redistribution. Furthermore, low 
economic growth (Hypothesis 1c) and high unemployment rates (Hypothesis 1d) are 
expected to reinforce support for redistribution. 
 
2.2 Institutionalist theory 
The idea that inequality has a direct positive effect on popular demand for redistribution 
has been contested from an institutionalist perspective. Whether existing inequalities 
incite support for more redistribution depends on the social justice conceptions that live 
among the public (Dallinger 2010). These redistributive ethics are culturally embedded 
the institutions of the welfare state (Mau 2004; Jæger 2006): Welfare institutions 
provide a normative framework of what can be considered as ‘normal’, and as such 
shape public opinion by means of feedback loops (Kumlin & Stadelmann-Steffen 2014). 
By consequence, the public legitimacy of income redistribution should be higher in 
welfare states that redistribute more strongly. This reasoning is consistent with 
Gijsberts’ (2002: 272) cognitive argument that ‘people adjust their normative standards 
to their perception of the situation’, and ‘existential theories’ stating that factual 
inequalities come to be perceived as legitimate over time (Kelly & Zagorski 2005). Also 
here, due to the high visibility of ‘the rich’ (Ragusa 2015), top income shares could be 
more influential than more comprehensive measures summarizing the total income 
distribution. 
  
In sum: contrary to hypotheses 1a and 1b, these arguments state that the prevailing level 
of economic inequality (hypothesis 2a) and particularly the concentration of income at the 
 7 
top of the distribution (Hypothesis 2b) are negatively related to the support for 
redistribution. 
 
The available empirical research has not been able to settle the discussion on the 
relationship between inequality and citizens’ support for redistribution, as findings are 
very mixed (see Schmidt-Catran 2016 for a review). Various studies report that 
inequality encourages support for redistribution, as median voter theory predicts 
(Dallinger 2010; Finseraas 2009; Jæger 2013; Schmidt-Catran 2016). Yet others present 
evidence for a negative effect of inequality (Bowles & Gintis 2000; Dion & Birchfield 
2010) or conclude that a significant relationship is absent (Lübker 2007; Kenworthy & 
McCall 2008). According to Schmidt-Catran (2016), the inconsistency in empirical 
findings is largely attributable to inappropriate research design: While cross-sectional 
comparisons often fail to control for relevant confounding factors, analyses based on 
aggregate time series do not take into account compositional differences. Detailed 
insight in the link between economic inequality and redistributive beliefs requires that 
contextual and individual differences are modelled simultaneously (e.g. by analysing 
repeated cross-sectional data using multilevel models).  
 
2.3 Cohort differences in redistributive preferences 
Without downplaying Schmidt-Catran’s (2016) methodological critique, I argue that 
there is a theoretical blind spot in current research that limits our understanding of 
redistributive preferences. The existing literature conceptualizes the impact of economic 
conditions on the demand for redistribution uniquely in terms of period effects. The 
present-day economic context is thought to have an impact that is uniform across birth 
cohorts. Furthermore, period effects are assumed to be instantaneous: Increased 
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inequality immediately affects popular social justice beliefs, and this effect is thought to 
wither as soon as inequality reverts to the original level. 
 
However, this period interpretation of the impact of economic context tends to overlook 
cohort dynamics. From a cohort perspective, social change is primordially the result of 
the replacement of older cohorts by younger ones (Mannheim [1928] 1952; Ryder 
1965). Because cohorts are socialized under different material conditions, they tend to 
develop divergent normative preferences and value patterns that remain relatively 
stable across the entire life span (Inglehart 1990). Citizens’ preferences are thus not 
driven by the state of the current economy, but rather by the economic conditions that 
prevailed during their formative years. As such, support for income redistribution 
should reflect past inequalities rather than the current situation (Becker & Hermkens 
1993).  
 
This cohort perspective has been used to study large-scale societal changes and 
important events, such as economic crisis or regime change. Elder’s (1999) famous 
cohort analysis on Children of the Great Depression shows that the economic crisis of the 
1930s left a permanent imprint on the social positions and values of participants in the 
Oakland Growth Study. Using the fall of the Berlin wall as a natural experiment, Svallfors 
(2010) observes that among cohorts socialized before 1989, support for state 
intervention is considerably stronger in Eastern than in Western Germany. That such 
differences are not found among younger birth cohorts suggests that cohort 
replacement is a key factor to understand changes in social justice beliefs. In similar 
vein, Kulin & Meuleman (2015) document outspoken differences in the values that drive 
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welfare support between Eastern Europeans socialized before and after the fall of 
communism.  
 
Applied to the study of the effect of income inequality, these arguments imply that birth 
cohorts will differ with respect to social justice beliefs, and that support for redistribution 
will be related to the level of economic inequality during the cohorts’ formative years, 
either positively (hypothesis 3) or negatively (hypothesis 4). 
 
2.4 Case selection: A comparison of redistributive attitudes in Britain and the US 
To test the impact of economic inequality, I select two country cases that have 
experienced considerable yet similar fluctuations in the levels of income inequality, 
namely Britain and the US. The inequality trend in both countries over the last century 
can be described as a ‘Great U-turn’ (Alderson & Nielsen 2002). In the first quarter of the 
20th century, income inequality was comparatively high in both countries. In 1925 the 
share of the top percentile in the national income amounted to 19.4% in the UK and 
17.6% in the US. Over the course of the Great Depression, the Second World War and 
implementation of post-war social policies, income inequality declined steadily to reach 
its lowest point in the 1970s. By 1975, the top 1% income share had fallen to 6.1% in the 
UK and 8.0% in the US. Since the neoliberal turn in the 1980s, inequalities are on the rise 
again and is nowadays approaching the situation prior to the crisis of the 1930s – the 
2010 top 1% income shares equal 14.7 and 17.5% in the UK and US respectively (Piketty 
2013).  
 
According to a variety of typologies, both countries are classified as liberal or residual 
welfare states (Ebbinghaus 2012). Despite belonging to the same regime type, the UK 
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and US differ substantively in the size of government, the amount of spending on social 
programs and the structure of taxation. Generally speaking, the UK takes a middle 
position between the small government of the US and the extended welfare states in 
Western Europe (Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote 2001). Although both countries are 
situated in the Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition, the US is characterised by a unique social 
and political culture rooted in the American Revolution. This ‘American exceptionalism’ 
(Lipset 1997) includes is a mixture of, among others, individualism, antistatism and 
laissez-faire economics (see also Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989). In sum, this transatlantic 
comparison offers an interesting mixture of differences and similarities in economic 
conditions, political institutions and ideological systems.  
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Datasets 
This paper analyses two repeated cross-sectional datasets, namely the British Social 
Attitudes (BSA) survey and the General Social Survey (GSS). The BSA is a face-to-face 
survey series among random probability samples of adults living in private households 
in Great Britain. Almost every year since 1983, about 3000 individuals were surveyed on 
a variety of social, political and economic topics. Data as well as technical reports are 
available via the UK Data Archive (http://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk). For this analysis, I 
merged the cumulative file 1983-1991 (Social and Community Planning Research 1996) 
with the more recent rounds. 
 
The GSS has been monitoring attitude change in the United States since 1972 (until 1994 
almost yearly, since 1994 biannually). Respondents are randomly selected from the 
population of adults living in households, and are interviewed by means of face-to-face 
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interviews (paper-and-pencil until 2000; computer-assisted since then). Data and 
documentation can be found at the NORC website (http://gss.norc.org).  Here, I analyse 
the Cross-sectional Cumulative data file, 1972-2014, release 6 (Smith, Marsden, Hout & 
Kim s.d.). 
 
This analysis uses all survey years in which support for income redistribution is 
measured. The BSA time series consists of 73,457 respondents surveyed over 25 years 
between 1986 and 2014. The GSS series contains 30,179 individuals interviewed over 
22 rounds between 1978 and 2014. Appendix Tables A1 and A2 provide an overview of 
the survey years and the respective sample sizes. 
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
Both time series measure support for income redistribution by means of a single survey 
question. In the case of the BSA, the following Likert-type statement is used: 
‘Government should redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well off.’ 
(answer categories from 1: agree strongly to 5: disagree strongly). The GSS uses a more 
lengthy introduction: ‘Some people think that the government in Washington ought to 
reduce the income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes 
of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the 
government should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the 
rich and the poor.’ Subsequently, respondents are invited to indicate their opinion by 
choosing a score between 1 (‘the government ought to reduce the income differences 
between rich and poor’) and 7 (‘the government should not concern itself with reducing 
income differences’).  
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These single items provide general but nevertheless clear indications of citizens’ 
opinions, as both items mention explicitly that income differences are at stake, and refer 
to the government as the actor to reduce such differences. Because of the obvious 
differences in question wording and answer scales, scores are not directly comparable 
between the BSA and the GSS.  
 
To facilitate interpretation of the results, both items were reversed (so that higher 
scores indicate stronger support for redistribution) and rescaled from 0 tot 10. 
 
3.3 Individual-level predictors 
Both datasets include a similar set of relevant predictors. Respondents are classified in 
five-year birth cohorts, ranging from the end of the 19th century to the mid-1990s (see 
Appendix Tables A1 and A2 for an overview). Besides birth cohorts, the models use the 
age of respondent at the time of survey (seven age categories to control for life cycle 
effects) and gender. Regarding racial/ethnic origin the BSA distinguishes respondents of 
white (including mixed), black and Asian origin, based on self-identification. In the case 
of the GSS, I collapsed the interviewer-coded racial origin into white, black and other.  
 
Respondents’ socio-economic positions are measured by means of educational level, 
employment status and household income. The BSA distinguishes between seven 
educational levels (Degree, Higher below degree, A-level, O-level, Certificate of 
Secondary Education, Foreign or other, No qualification). The GSS has five categories 
(Graduate, Bachelor’s, Associate/Junior college, High school, Less than high school). The 
variable employment status takes information on the main activity (working or not) as 
well as the type of employment into account. Based on the BSA’s socio-economic 
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grouping of respondents (variable RSEG), I categorize those active in the labour market 
into the service class, self-employed, routine non-manual, skilled manual and non-
skilled manual workers. In the case of the GSS, International Standard Classification of 
Occupation (ISCO) codes were used to create a similar categorization. To construct an 
income variable that is sufficiently comparable across currencies and time, the following 
steps were taken. First, the household income was equivalized to take differences in 
household income into account. Second, this equivalized household income was 
expressed as a percentage of the median income of the relevant reference group (i.e. the 
respondents surveyed in the same year and belonging to the same birth cohort).2 Third, 
this percentage was categorized into five income groups (namely <50%, 50-80%, 80–
120%, 120–200% and >200% of the median equivalized household income). A sixth 
category ‘missing’ is created to deal with the considerable item non-response on the 
income variable. 
 
Descriptive statistics for all individual-level predictors can be found in Appendix Table 
A3. 
 
3.4 Contextual predictors at the year and cohort level 
Period and cohort mechanisms are disentangled by using contextual characteristics of 
survey years as well as formative years of birth cohorts. The year variables contain 
contextual information referring to the year in which respondents were surveyed. Based 
on the above-mentioned theoretical arguments, we include the GINI index of the 
equivalized disposable (post-tax and post-transfers) household income (UK: Office for 
                                                        
2 This operationalization takes into account that incomes fluctuate across the life cycle, with the highest 
income towards the end of the professional career, and that individuals compare themselves with 
primarily with members of the own birth cohort. Equivalized household income as a percentage of the 
median of the total population yields very similar results. 
 14 
National Statistics; US: Census Bureau) as well as the top 1% income share (source: 
World Top Incomes Database). Both indicators measure a quite distinct aspect of 
income inequality. The GINI index is a comprehensive measure that summarizes the 
complete income distribution, and is especially sensitive to changes in the middle of the 
distribution. The top 1% income share maps evolutions at the high end of the income 
ladder (Alvaredo 2011). While the GINI index is based on survey data, the top 1% 
income share is based on administrative tax data, which allows constructing comparable 
time series across a longer time span (Piketty 2003). 
 
As indicators of economic strain, I include real GDP growth (UK: Eurostat, indicator 
nama_10_gdp; US: Federal Reserve Economic Data) and the unemployment rate (UK: 
Eurostat, indicator une_rt_a; US: Labour Statistics from the Current Population Survey). 
The political party in power (UK: Labour vs. Conservative prime minister; US: 
Democratic vs. Republican president) is included as a political control variable (Iversen 
& Soskice 2006; Listhaug & Aalberg 1999).  
 
Cohort variables refer to the contextual conditions during the formative years of birth 
cohorts, i.e. late adolescence and young adulthood. I calculate for every respondent the 
average of context variables over the period between 17 and 21 years old.3 Ideally, the 
model would include all contextual variables that are used at the period level at the 
cohort level as well. Given that the analysis includes respondents born more than a 
century ago, the choice for cohort-level context variables is severely restricted by data 
availability. Piketty (2013) provides information on the top 1% income share since 1908 
for the UK and 1917 for the US (http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c2). Real GDP 
                                                        
3 Additional analyses show that the conclusions are robust against the changes in the definition of 
formative period.  
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growth was taken from the Maddison Historical GDP time series 
(http://worldeconomics.com). For the UK, the historical unemployment rate could be 
retrieved from the series ‘Three centuries of macroeconomic data’ collected by the Bank 
of England. No historical time series are available for the GINI coefficients in both 
countries and the unemployment rate in the US. Table 1 summarizes the available 
contextual indicators at the period- and cohort-level. 
 
Table 1. Availability of contextual indicators used in the analysis 
Concept Indicator 
Year-level Cohort-level 
UK US UK US 
Level of inequality 
1% income share x x x x 
GINI coefficient x x 
  
Economic strain 
Real GDP growth x x x x 
Unemployment rate x x x 
 
x: contextual indicator is available 
 
3.5 Statistical modelling: Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort analysis 
To gain insight in the distinct character of period and cohort differences, I use the 
Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort (HAPC) model for repeated cross-sections developed by 
Yang & Land (2006). The point of departure of this approach is that individual 
respondents are nested within birth cohorts on the one hand, and survey years on the 
other hand, which creates a double but non-nested hierarchical structure. Estimating a 
cross-classified multilevel model with random year and cohort effects renders it 
possible to distinguish between these two mechanisms of social change: 
𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑗𝑘) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖(𝑗𝑘) + 𝜐0𝑗 + 𝜈0𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖(𝑗𝑘) (1) 
In equation (1), 𝑆𝑅𝑖(𝑗𝑘) refers to the support for redistribution of individual i belonging 
to birth cohort j surveyed in year k. Note that j and k are written between parentheses to 
indicate that these two nesting structures are independent from each other. To control 
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for life cycle effects, support for redistribution is modelled as a function of the 
respondents’ age (𝛽1 indicates the fixed age effect). The model contains three error 
components, namely residuals for specific birth cohorts (𝜐0𝑗 - the random cohort 
effects), for particular years (𝜈0𝑘 – the random year effects) and individual-level 
residuals (𝜀𝑖(𝑗𝑘) ). This model can be extended straightforwardly to incorporate 
characteristics of individuals (𝑋𝑖(𝑗𝑘)), cohorts (𝑍𝑗) or years (𝑍𝑘) as explanatory variables. 
 
Recently, the HAPC-approach has been criticized for not being able to solve the long-
standing age-period-cohort identification problem and to disentangle the common 
linear trend of age, period and cohort differences (e.g. Bell & Jones 2014). As shown 
below, however, this analysis yields non-linear cohort and year effects in the first place. 
As such, the HAPC model is appropriate to shed light on the cohort and period effects in 
redistributive beliefs present in the BSA and the GSS.  
 
All models below are estimated using the MIXED procedure SAS version 9.3. Although 
strictly speaking, the dependent variable is ordinal with a limited number of scale 
points, I use a linear model specification (Ferrer-i-Carbonel & Frijters 2004; for a similar 
approach see Schmidt-Catran 2016). The analyses are weighted using the design 
weights correcting for unequal probabilities of selection (BSA: wtfactor until 2005, oldwt 
since then; GSS: wtssall).  
 
The models were estimated using a stepwise procedure. First, I introduce all individual 
predictors. Next, each of the year- and cohort-variables is tested in a separate model, 
controlling for the individual predictors (these ‘bivariate’ contextual effects are included 
in Appendix Table A4). Ultimately, I estimate a parsimonious final model including only 
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contextual variables that were found to have a significant effect. This procedure avoids 
including a too large number of contextual predictors for the relatively small number of 
observations at the year- and cohort level (Meuleman & Billiet 2009). Below, the results 
for these final models are reported. 
 
4. Findings  
4.1 Trends in support for income redistribution 
The gross trend of the average support for income redistribution (see Figure 1) 
evidences a moderately positive stance of British and American citizens towards income 
redistribution. With the exception of the period 2005-2007 in Britain, all year averages 
exceed the midpoint of the 0 to 10-scale. The averages for Britain and the US are 
remarkably similar. Although differences in question wording obstruct a direct 
numerical comparison, one can safely say that there is no evidence that the American 
citizens are more averse from redistribution than their British counterparts. Clearly, the 
‘American exceptionalism’ (Lipset 1997) is not reflected in popular opinions on 
redistributive justice.  
 
Figure 1 displays relative stability in support for income redistribution. Over 35 years, 
the British and American averages fluctuate only mildly (between 5 and 6 on the 0-10 
scale). The British data reveals relatively strong support for redistribution in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. After having reached a maximum in 1994 (5.93), a gradual 
decrease takes place until 2005 (4.75). Since 2005, a slight revival can be noticed. In the 
US, support for income redistribution is relatively high during the 1980s (with a peak of 
5.91 in 1990), then decreases over the course of the 1990s (with a low point of 5.01 in 
1994), and finally increases again during the 2000s. Remarkably, the GSS data suggests a 
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short-lived effect of the financial crisis: In 2010 demand for redistribution decreases 
considerably, but bounces back to its pre-crisis level in 2012. In Britain, the 2008 crisis 
does not have a noticeable impact. 
 
Figure 1. Average support for income redistribution by year in Britain and the US, 1978-
2014 
Note: This graph represents year averages for support for income redistribution on a 0-10 scale, as measured 
in the BSA (for GB) and the GSS (for the US). Averages are weighted by means of design weights to correct 
unequal probabilities of selection. 
 
The trends shown in Figure 1 are superficial in the sense that they do not only capture 
period effects, but are contaminated by different compositions in terms of birth cohorts. 
As such, these findings are only preliminary and more detailed analysis is called for.  
 
4.2 Empty models: The presence of period and cohort differences 
To decompose the total variation into differences between individuals, survey years and 
cohorts, I estimate empty models (that is, without predictors). The variance 
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decomposition diverges considerably between Britain and the US. In the British case, the 
variance at the year level (estimate: 0.091; p-value = .0004) is considerably larger than 
the cohort-level variation (estimate: 0.011; p-value = 0.0114).4 In the US, on the 
contrary, differences between birth cohorts (estimate: 0121; p-value = 0.0038) are more 
outspoken than the year-by-year changes (estimate: 0.077; p-value = 0.0018). Clearly, 
different mechanisms underlie the pattern of changes in redistributive preferences in 
the US and Britain. In both datasets, the residual variance (BSA: 7.583; p <.0001; GSS: 
10.60; p<.0001) is far in excess over the year and cohort variation. Although the higher-
level variance components are comparatively small, insight in period and cohort 
differences can deepen our understanding of redistributive beliefs. 
 
Not so much the presence of period and cohort differences, but especially the specific 
pattern of these differences is of great relevance. Figure 2 displays the residuals at the 
cohort and year level, i.e. how particular survey years and birth cohorts deviate from the 
overall average support for redistribution. Regarding the year-level residuals, more or 
less similar patterns can be seen in Britain and the US, with above average support for 
redistribution during the 1980s, and lower levels during the late 1990s (especially in 
Britain) and the 2000s (foremost in the US). In both countries, the year-by-year 
variations are comparable in size: The difference between the years with the highest and 
lowest support for redistribution equals 1.12 on Britain, and 0.92 in the US, which is 
substantively relevant on a scale from 0 to 10. 
 
                                                        
4 The small observed cohort variance in Britain underestimates cohort dynamics, however. When 
controlling for individual predictors, the cohort variance doubles, meaning that the differential 
composition of birth cohorts in terms of individual characteristics supresses differences in support for 
income redistribution.  
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The pattern of cohort residuals, by contrast, reveals marked transatlantic differences. In 
the US, the birth cohorts born between 1920 and 1960 –whose formative period took 
place during the era of lower economic inequality- are most averse of income reduction 
by the government. Among the cohorts born after 1970 –and thus socialized in times of 
increasing inequality- the demand for redistribution is more outspoken. The difference 
in redistributive support between the most (born between 1986 and 1990) and least 
(1931-1935) supportive birth cohort exceeds 1 scale point. In Britain, cohort differences 
are not only comparatively smaller. They also follow exactly the opposite pattern: The 
younger British cohorts are more critical of redistribution than citizens born between 
1920 and 1960.  
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Figure 2. Year- and cohort-level residuals based on empty and final models of support for income redistribution, BSA and GSS data   
  
  
Note: This figure represents the higher-level residuals of a cross-classified multilevel model for support for income redistribution. Parameter estimates for this model can 
be found in Table 2.  
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4.3 Individual predictors of support for income redistribution  
The effects of individual socio-economic characteristics (see Table 2) show remarkable 
similarities between Britain and the US. In line with median voter theory, household 
income is inversely related to support for income redistribution. Compared to the 
lowest incomes, persons earning an income at least twice the median score 1.521 
(Britain) or 1.420 (US) points lower on support for redistribution. In both countries, the 
effect of education is curve-linear. Initially, support for redistribution decreases as the 
educational level goes up. Yet obtaining the highest credential (‘Degree’ in Britain, 
‘Graduate’ in the US) strengthens support for redistribution compared to the one-but-
highest educational level. This finding illustrates the double face of education: Schooling 
improves one’s socio-economic position (thereby decreasing the interest in 
redistribution) but at the same time socializes democratic and tolerant values (Portes 
1998). Also the effects of employment status show great consistency. In Britain as well 
as the US, the service class and the self-employed show most opposition against 
redistribution. Economically more vulnerable groups, such as the non-skilled labourers 
or those outside the labour market are more inclined to support redistribution.  
 
The effects of demographic control variables, however, are less consistent across the 
two countries. In the US, age has an almost linear, negative effect on support for 
redistribution: Elderly are less inclined to favour redistribution than youngsters. In 
Britain the age effect is not only considerably weaker, but also runs in the opposite 
direction. In Britain, females are less supportive of redistribution than men, while the 
opposite is true for the US. Possibly, the inconsistency in gender and age effects is 
related to the different wording of the item measuring support for income 
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redistribution. Finally, White citizen are less supportive than minority groups (who 
often occupy less favourable economic positions) in both countries.  
 
4.4 Contextual predictors of support for income redistribution  
The primary purpose of this analysis, however, is to find out how cohort- or year-level 
indicators of economic context relate to public opinions. The results show that the 
inequality context matters indeed, be it in diverse and intricate ways. Evidence for the 
existence of period effects of inequality (i.e., the effect that has received most scholarly 
attention) is mixed. In Britain, the top 1% income share in the year of survey seems to 
be connected to demand for redistribution. Contrary to the mediation voter theory 
(hypothesis 1b) but in line with the institutionalist perspective (hypothesis 2b), Britons’ 
demand for redistribution is lower in times of a strong concentration of income at the 
top. To assess the substantive relevance of this year effect, one can compare the 
predicted values for the minimum and maximum values of top income share. The 
predicted difference in redistributive support for the year with the lowest (7.6% in 
1986) and the highest (16.5% in 2013) value for the top 1% income share equals almost 
0.75 points. Interestingly, the GINI index (the most frequently used indicator in previous 
research) shows no such period effect (thereby rejecting hypotheses 2a and 2b). Public 
opinion seems to be more sensitive for evolutions at the very top of the income 
distribution than for the form of the total distribution. In the US no effects of inequality 
in the year of survey were detected, and all hypotheses regarding period effects of 
inequality (1a, 1b, 2a, 2b) are refuted.   
 
Contrary to the period effect, both countries show a significant cohort effect of the top 
1% income share. Redistributive preferences seem to be responsive to the inequality 
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context during adolescence, a factor that has been largely neglected in previous 
research. However, this cohort effect has a different sign in the US and the UK, 
suggesting that different mechanism might be at work. In the US, experiences of a 
heavily skewed income distribution during adolescence seem to have a lasting positive 
effect on the demand for redistribution (in line with hypothesis 3). The cohorts 
socialized during the post-war era of low inequality seem to be least concerned about 
inequality, while younger cohorts growing up in a context of rising inequalities are more 
supportive of redistribution. The predicted difference in support for the cohorts 
socialized in the early 1970s (top 1% income share: 7.82%) vs. cohorts socialized in the 
late 1920s (18.88%) amounts to a half scale point. In Britain, the observed effect has the 
opposite sign and is considerably weaker: Inequality during the formative years has a 
negative impact on support for income redistribution (confirming hypothesis 4). The 
difference in predicted values for the minimum and maximum values for top 1% income 
share equals 0.32. The presence of opposing effects is consistent with the earlier 
observation that cohort variation is patterned completely differently at both sides of the 
Atlantic. 
 
In Britain also the unemployment is relevant to understand change in redistributive 
opinions. First, Brits who were confronted with large numbers of unemployed persons 
during adolescence develop less favourable attitudes towards income redistribution. 
The unemployment rate at the year of survey had a significant impact when tested 
separately (see Appendix Table A4), but this effect disappears here under control of the 
other year characteristics.5  
                                                        
5 Additionally, I estimated models with interactions between inequality and the rate of economic growth 
(both at the year and at the cohort level). After all, citizens’ evaluations of inequality might be contingent 
on the general economic prosperity: in times of strong growth, people at the bottom of the ladder might 
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Besides economic indicators, social justice beliefs are related to the political context, 
here indicated by the political party in power. In both countries the demand for 
redistribution is systematically more elevated in years when the power is in the hands 
of the party least in favour of redistribution (i.e. a Conservative prime minister in 
Britain, a Republican president in the US). This finding points towards reactive 
processes (Listhaug & Aalberg 1999): Policy innovations are often followed by an 
immediate reversal of aggregate public preferences.  
 
In the US, the final model is quite successful in predicting differences between years as 
well as cohorts. The proportions of explained variance at the year and the cohort level 
equal 62% and 89% respectively. Of course, these high proportions should be evaluated 
keeping in mind that the amount of variation located at these levels is comparatively 
small compared to the individual-level variance (of which the US model explains 8%). 
For the British data, the explained variance at year, cohort and individual level equals 
66, 22 and 5%. The British model is thus far less successful in explaining cohort 
differences (that were very small in the first place). The same message can be deduced 
from Figure 2, where the various higher-level residuals (grey bars) are considerably 
smaller than the residuals of the empty model (black bars).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
willing to accept high inequality because they believe that ‘the rising tides lifts all boats’. None of the 
interaction effects were found to be significant, however. 
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Table 2. Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort models for support for income redistribution 
 
Great Britain (BSA) 
  
United States (GSS) 
Fixed effects 
   
Fixed effects 
  Intercept 7.785 *** 
 
Intercept 5.390 *** 
A
ge
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 18-24 0.150 ** 
 
A
ge
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 18-24 0.092 
 25-34 0.021 
  
25-34 0.196 ** 
35-44 -0.075 * 
 
35-44 0.029 
 45-54 (ref.cat.) 
   
45-54 (ref.cat.) 
  55-64 0.029 
  
55-64 -0.026 
 65-74 -0.063 
  
65-74 -0.381 *** 
75+ -0.087 
  
75+ -0.545 *** 
G
en
-
d
er
 Male (ref.cat.) 
   G
en
-
d
er
 Male (ref.cat.) 
  Female -0.338 *** 
 
Female 0.419 *** 
R
ac
ia
l 
o
ri
gi
n
 White / mixed (ref.cat.) 
   
R
ac
ia
l 
o
ri
gi
n
 White (ref.cat.) 
  Black  0.402 *** 
 
Black  1.242 *** 
Asian 0.250 *** 
 
Other 0.680 *** 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 le
v
el
 Degree 0.173 *** 
 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 le
v
el
 Graduate -0.581 *** 
Higher below degree -0.557 *** 
 
Bachelor's -1.240 *** 
A-level -0.586 *** 
 
Associate / Junior college -0.752 *** 
O-level -0.590 *** 
 
High school -0.723 *** 
Certificate Secondary 
Education -0.324 *** 
 
Less than high school (ref.cat.) 
  Foreign / other -0.416 *** 
    No qualification (ref.cat.) 
      
E
m
p
lo
y
em
en
t 
st
at
u
s 
Not working 0.237 *** 
 
E
m
p
lo
y
em
en
t 
st
at
u
s 
Not working 0.231 *** 
service class (ref.cat.) 
   
service class (ref.cat.) 
  routine non-manual 0.118 ** 
 
routine non-manual 0.289 *** 
skilled manual 0.248 *** 
 
skilled manual 0.375 *** 
non-skilled manual 0.491 *** 
 
non-skilled manual 0.465 *** 
self-employed -0.325 *** 
 
self-employed -0.311 *** 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
in
co
m
e 
(%
 o
f 
m
ed
ia
n
) 
<50% (ref.cat.) 
   
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 
in
co
m
e 
(%
 o
f 
m
ed
ia
n
) 
<50% (ref.cat.) 
  50-80%  -0.433 *** 
 
50-80%  -0.334 *** 
80-120% -0.871 *** 
 
80-120% -0.524 *** 
120-200% -1.220 *** 
 
120-200% -0.838 *** 
>200%  -1.521 *** 
 
>200%  -1.420 *** 
Missing -0.744 *** 
 
Missing -0.604 *** 
Cohort : Income share top 1% -0.020 * 
 
Cohort : Income share top 1% 0.045 *** 
Cohort: Unemployment rate -0.009 
      Year: Income share top 1% -0.084 *** 
     Year: Unemployment rate -0.063 
      Year: Conservative prime minister 0.475 *** 
 
Year: Conservative prime minister 0.293 *** 
Random effects 
   
Random effects 
  
 
Variance year effects 0.031 ** 
  
Variance year effects 0.029 ** 
 
Variance cohort effects 0.009 * 
  
Variance cohort effects 0.014 * 
 
Residual variance 7.190 *** 
  
Residual variance 9.779 *** 
Deviance (-2LL) 340613.6 
  
Deviance (-2LL) 154046.3 
* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Entries are parameter estimates from a cross-classified linear multilevel model 
with random intercepts for survey year and birth cohort. Weighted for unequal selection probabilities in the 
sampling design. BSA: N(individuals) = 69,635; N(years) = 25; N(cohorts) = 19. GSS: N(individuals) = 29,516; 
N(years) = 22; N(cohorts) = 20 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper attempted to find out to what extents popular beliefs regarding solidarity 
and social justice are influenced by the economic context citizens are confronted with. 
Analysing repeated cross-sectional survey data from the BSA (1986-2014) and the GSS 
(1978-2014) by means of HAPC models (Yang & Land 2006) made it possible to 
disentangle cohort and year differences in redistributive preferences, and to test 
whether these preferences depend on the prevailing economic context or on economic 
conditions during the formative years. 
 
The observed relationship between income inequality and redistributive support 
deviates in several respects from what median voter theory (Meltzer & Richard 1981) 
predicts. A higher level of income inequality in the year of survey is, neither in Britain 
nor in the US, related to increased support for redistribution. Overall, these results 
endorse the conclusion of Kenworthy & McCall (2008: 35) that median voter theory is of 
little use to understand the nexus between inequality and redistributive support. This 
does not imply that the inequality context is irrelevant to understand social justice 
beliefs, however. The presented findings suggest several points of departure for a 
reconceptualization of the inequality-attitudes link, even if the results are sometimes 
inconsistent and therefore tentative. 
 
A noteworthy conclusion is that Americans’ social justice beliefs are more clearly related 
to the level of income inequality during their formative years than to contemporary 
inequalities. American cohorts socialized during the post-war period of prosperity and 
low inequality are most averse of income redistribution by the government. This 
between-cohort variation should not be overstated, but is substantially meaningful: The 
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differences between the most and the least supportive cohorts are comparable in size to 
the impact of education, racial origin or employment status. Cohort differences in the US 
can be almost fully explained by the economic and political climate during the cohorts’ 
formative years. These findings are relevant to interpret the pattern of political 
participation of American youngsters, who are growing up in times of high inequality. 
 
Yet at the same time, the British data tell a quite different story. In Britain, cohort 
differences are far less marked, and structured differently: The British cohorts that 
experienced high inequality during their formative period show a higher (and not lower, 
as in the US) level of support for redistribution. At this point, a definitive explanation for 
this puzzling difference between the US and Britain is lacking. The unique combination 
of economic prosperity, the social programs of the ‘Great Society’ and the rise of 
consumer culture might have instilled the optimistic idea that redistribution is 
unnecessary among US citizens socialized during the 1950s and 1960s. Experiences of 
the Second World War might have tempered such optimism in Britain and created 
different set of social justice beliefs. It is important to realize that the specific pattern 
found in the US is largely driven by the particular historical context of post-war US; It 
should therefore not be interpreted as a universal mechanism that can be generalized to 
other Western countries. Yet, these results do underline the potential relevance of 
cohort dynamics for our understanding of redistributive support – a factor that has been 
largely neglected in previous research.  
 
Besides cohort effects of economic inequality, the British data reveals an impact of the 
top 1% income share prevailing in the year of survey. In line with the institutionalist 
perspective (Jæger 2006; Mau 2004), British citizens living in a period with a stronger 
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concentration of income at the top are more supportive of redistribution. Interestingly, a 
no such effect is found when the GINI index is used as an indicator instead of the top 
incomes share. This suggests that evolutions at the top of the income distribution are 
more relevant to understand redistributive preferences than the form of the total 
income distribution. By consequence, the inequality effect cannot be understood in 
terms of pure self-interest mechanisms as median voter theory predicts. The 
politicization and mobilization of contentious subjects such as the wealth of the rich 
seems to play a role in opinion formation (Ragusa 2015). 
 
The diverging patterns in the UK and the US point towards a limitation of this study: The 
results are confined to two specific contexts that are similar in several respects. It would 
be of great interest to extend these analyses to other countries. Future research –
preferably with a broad comparative scope- is needed to contextualize the seemingly 
inconsistent patterns of between-cohort variation, and to find out which period and 
cohort characteristics structure redistributive preferences. However, the possibilities 
for such comparative research are seriously hampered by the limited availability of 
long-term time series. Finally, the use of single items to measure redistributive support 
is suboptimal, because measurement error cannot be taken into account. Among others, 
the presence of random measurement error might lead to underestimated year and 
cohort differences and diluted effect parameters. 
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Appendix 1.  
Table A1. Sample sizes per survey year and birth cohort - BSA 
Year 
Birth cohort 
 
1
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1
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9
1
1
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1
5
 
1
9
1
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1
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2
5
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3
5
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1
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7
5
 
1
9
7
6
-
8
0
 
1
9
8
1
-
8
5
 
1
9
8
6
-
9
0
 
1
9
9
1
-
9
6
 
Total 
1986 28 42 54 66 69 93 97 108 132 139 133 119 133 86 0 0 0 0 0 1299 
1987 26 50 87 140 194 184 201 207 224 265 258 222 220 169 0 0 0 0 0 2447 
1989 19 58 97 152 185 159 173 186 266 256 243 252 251 215 51 0 0 0 0 2563 
1990 24 42 90 103 172 179 154 175 219 254 239 231 226 211 73 0 0 0 0 2392 
1992 16 57 100 143 200 183 186 219 195 263 200 279 240 238 106 0 0 0 0 2625 
1993 18 34 70 116 180 164 156 172 194 248 264 262 252 278 168 0 0 0 0 2576 
1994 18 64 162 276 330 406 442 350 420 550 478 576 752 552 296 64 0 0 0 5736 
1995 4 32 78 134 191 221 196 203 244 259 274 303 351 316 195 62 0 0 0 3063 
1996 8 34 75 122 198 206 179 208 231 266 274 295 342 288 209 90 0 0 0 3025 
1998 1 10 50 85 122 154 168 181 180 202 204 257 272 285 177 118 0 0 0 2466 
1999 0 10 27 77 146 174 193 182 172 198 190 218 265 240 172 108 26 0 0 2398 
2000 1 6 34 86 145 175 200 243 204 239 224 284 340 275 261 165 59 0 0 2941 
2001 1 4 23 70 140 143 184 194 212 262 208 262 315 310 209 146 66 0 0 2749 
2002 3 5 21 61 119 145 157 189 236 234 207 269 317 317 239 174 126 0 0 2819 
2003 1 2 17 63 146 188 224 248 279 344 302 293 352 365 298 250 156 0 0 3528 
2005 0 1 9 56 121 177 199 240 300 329 299 308 353 357 283 215 188 63 0 3498 
2006 0 1 5 40 106 143 226 244 283 370 276 305 374 383 307 280 220 127 0 3690 
2007 0 1 7 34 108 157 220 233 270 298 280 296 316 363 339 251 176 131 0 3480 
2008 0 2 5 27 90 156 209 257 323 348 317 317 392 394 358 296 205 192 1 3889 
2009 0 0 3 11 42 87 154 193 191 256 253 264 285 293 274 220 191 123 29 2869 
2010 0 0 1 14 36 95 113 167 245 267 233 204 267 259 268 193 179 140 53 2734 
2011 0 0 3 5 39 87 127 173 200 283 225 206 256 262 250 250 224 123 79 2792 
2012 0 0 0 10 33 94 128 181 241 290 222 223 256 258 240 196 173 126 106 2777 
2013 0 0 0 8 48 74 119 141 214 262 226 259 219 240 247 215 192 155 144 2763 
2014 0 0 0 2 16 51 91 148 194 229 211 204 217 199 216 179 127 142 112 2338 
Total 168 455 1018 1901 3176 3895 4496 5042 5869 6911 6240 6708 7563 7153 5236 3472 2308 1322 524 73457 
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Table A2. Sample sizes per survey year and birth cohort - GSS 
Year 
Birth cohort 
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Total 
1978 38 42 45 48 44 57 52 44 76 74 97 95 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 746 
1980 38 40 62 111 86 112 95 99 105 131 186 160 161 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 1415 
1983 19 36 54 81 99 110 113 83 119 129 177 209 229 94 0 0 0 0 0 0 1552 
1984 17 33 52 57 91 95 95 79 101 120 176 161 197 157 2 0 0 0 0 0 1433 
1986 12 30 56 61 98 93 82 84 94 131 155 179 188 140 38 0 0 0 0 0 1441 
1987 12 26 50 74 100 121 96 105 114 165 185 227 225 188 87 0 0 0 0 0 1775 
1988 6 14 23 48 70 60 68 45 48 81 103 109 107 119 68 0 0 0 0 0 969 
1989 6 12 24 44 46 62 58 55 83 79 94 124 124 112 87 3 0 0 0 0 1013 
1990 0 10 20 30 57 55 50 47 44 58 99 109 117 86 78 11 0 0 0 0 871 
1991 0 7 24 31 54 49 64 58 54 64 100 119 142 106 95 19 0 0 0 0 986 
1993 0 6 14 34 49 56 49 54 56 82 110 131 134 116 86 55 0 0 0 0 1032 
1994 0 14 22 46 81 93 102 113 125 153 199 220 262 244 196 97 6 0 0 0 1973 
1996 0 0 24 29 58 63 101 97 91 145 183 207 218 231 199 171 51 0 0 0 1868 
1998 0 0 11 35 54 90 84 79 99 119 157 194 217 259 199 161 109 0 0 0 1867 
2000 0 0 0 27 47 67 89 80 94 111 164 184 227 201 199 170 144 38 0 0 1842 
2002 0 0 0 10 20 24 44 44 44 52 76 95 101 78 118 75 83 32 0 0 896 
2004 0 0 0 4 9 29 27 25 49 58 72 81 96 95 84 80 81 66 7 0 863 
2006 0 0 0 0 31 45 56 88 85 110 140 201 203 206 200 195 184 157 50 0 1951 
2008 0 0 0 0 16 18 48 54 57 86 100 142 138 124 122 136 111 115 74 0 1341 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 30 48 45 55 82 99 133 135 116 127 112 120 128 98 31 1359 
2012 0 0 0 0 0 25 32 42 58 73 109 108 123 120 113 118 125 121 102 52 1321 
2014 0 0 0 0 0 11 30 48 77 85 113 139 181 150 122 167 157 166 131 88 1665 
Total 148 270 481 770 1110 1365 1483 1468 1728 2188 2894 3327 3559 2971 2220 1570 1171 823 462 171 30179 
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics for the individual-level predictors 
 
Great Britain: BSA 
 
United States: GSS 
 
Frequency Percentage 
  
Frequency Percentage 
A
ge
 c
at
eg
o
ry
 
18-24 5910 8.05 
 
18-24 2897 9.60 
25-34 12844 17.49 
 
25-34 6689 22.16 
35-44 14322 19.50 
 
35-44 6345 21.02 
45-54 12446 16.94 
 
45-54 4924 16.32 
55-64 11460 15.60 
 
55-64 3917 12.98 
65-74 9727 13.24 
 
65-74 3177 10.53 
75+ 6748 9.19 
 
75+ 2230 7.39 
G
en
d
er
 Male 32277 43.88 
 
Male 13380 44.20 
Female 41282 56.12 
 
Female 16891 55.80 
R
ac
ia
l 
o
ri
gi
n
 White / mixed 68732 95.51 
 
White 24398 80.60 
Black 1894 2.63 
 
Black 4150 13.71 
Asian 1334 1.85 
 
Other 1723 5.69 
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
al
 le
v
el
 
Degree 10708 14.96 
 
Less than high school 5801 19.20 
Higher below degree 9609 13.42 
 
High school 15683 51.90 
A-level 9730 13.59 
 
Associate / Junior 
college 
1843 6.10 
O-level 13822 19.31 
 
Bachelor's 4666 15.44 
Certificate Secondary 
Education 
6118 8.55 
 
Graduate 2222 7.35 
Foreign / other 900 1.26 
    
No qualification 20710 28.93 
    
E
m
p
lo
y
em
en
t 
st
at
u
s 
Not working 34717 47.41 
 
Not working 11670 38.82 
service class 17612 24.05 
 
service class 8028 26.70 
routine non-manual 8882 12.13 
 
routine non-manual 2652 8.82 
skilled manual 5060 6.91 
 
skilled manual 2200 7.32 
non-skilled manual 4536 6.19 
 
non-skilled manual 3551 11.81 
self-employed 2424 3.31 
 
self-employed 1963 6.53 
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
 i
n
co
m
e 
(%
 o
f 
m
ed
ia
n
) <50% 16540 22.50  
<50% 8236 27.24 
50-80% 14133 19.23 
 
50-80% 5534 18.30 
80-120% 14089 19.17 
 
80-120% 5422 17.93 
120-200% 14111 19.20 
 
120-200% 5094 16.85 
>200% 5644 7.68 
 
>200% 2754 9.11 
Missing 8990 12.23 
 
Missing 3197 10.57 
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A4. Context effects for various year- and cohort-level predictors 
 
BSA 
 
GSS 
Year characteristics 
     Real GDP growth rate 1.797 
  
-0.005 
 Gini index -0.008 
  
-0.809 
 Income share top 1% -0.103 *** 
   Unemployment rate 0.122 *** 
 
-0.017 
 Conservative prime minister / republican president 0.498 *** 
 
0.313 *** 
Cohort characteristics 
     Real GDP growth rate -0.007 
  
-0.005 
 Income share top 1% -0.025 *** 
 
0.044 *** 
Unemployment rate -0.017 ** 
   * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. Entries are parameter estimates from a cross-classified linear multilevel model 
with random intercepts for survey year and birth cohort. Every parameter reported here was estimated in a 
separate model with one contextual variable and individual control variables (see Table 1 for an overview of 
individual controls included). Weighted for unequal selection probabilities in the sampling design. BSA: 
N(individuals) = 69,635; N(years) = 25; N(cohorts) = 19. GSS: N(individuals) = 29,516; N(years) = 22; 
N(cohorts) = 20 
